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GLOBALIZATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Globalization on Course
Thanks to increasing international trade in goods and services, capital flows,
and operational linkages among business firms, worldwide integration and interde-
pendence is now a fact of life. This is globalization.1
For all of its many problems, giobalization is worth pursuing as a way to raise
the world’s living standards. Its call for open markets is direct. It is often not simple
to put in practice as public policy. Its decline during the turbulent years between
World War I and II underscores how difficult it is to put such policy in place.
Nevertheless, by the I 950s the world economy again resumed its upward trend
toward globalization. Still, the road is not smooth.
Turbulence In Capital and Money Markets
Critics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) argue that the JiMF’s mista-
kes may well have created a backlash against globalization in the post-Cold War
years.2 The Asian and Russian crises in the closing years of the 1990s and IMF
attempts at fixing problems complicated the advance of Western-type market
economies. A case in point is Malaysia, which in September 1998 effectively cut
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itself off from global financial markets by imposing controls on international capital
flows. The country had benefited considerably for more than a decade by
encouraging such flows. Decline of its currency and stock market was blamed on
international capital movements prompting the country to reimpose controls.
Attempts to jumpstart or protect economies very often make matters worse.
Controls may work in the short run as nations can hoard funds that investors cannot
change into dollars and other hard currency. Eventually, such controls break down
thanks in part to the ingenuity of people. To keep them effective, even greater
controls and greater government intrusion into economic activity will be the end
result. In general, controls are unmanageable and very susceptible to graft and
corruption.
Nevertheless, controls on short-term currency flows continue to be popular
particularly since the currency turmoil of 1997-1998. Some observers point to the
apparent success of the Chinese model, which welcomes foreign investment in
factories and businesses but imposes strict controls on currency trading. Indeed,
they note that countries whose currencies have not been freely convertible have
done best. Chile’s successful attempts to discourage the inflow of volatile short-
term money is tempered by the caution of its economists that controls should be
used only as a preventive measure by countries that already have in place solid
fiscal, monetary, and exchange-rate policies.
Other observers argue that controls should be considered provided they can
be designed to discourage short-term investment such as bank loans or short-term
currency trades without disrupting foreign investment in factories and infrastructure.
In fact, the World Bank has conducted studies examining the experiences of such
countries as Chile, Colombia, Thailand, and the Czech Republic that have
experimented with such controls. Still others argue that such controls should disrupt
ordinary business such as travel as little as possible, clearly be temporary, be
accompanied by a highly competitive exchange rate, and be used as an aid to reform
and not as an alternative.
The backlash against globalization draws strength from perceived negative
effects in local labor markets. Trade encourages countries to move more resources
including labor to those industries in which they have a comparative advantage.
Needless to say, there are winners and losers of such trade adjustments. The
necessary adjustments can be very painful indeed. In order to ease such adjustment
costs, various policy measures are put forward. These include some form of
compensation for losers such as job retraining, relocation assistance associated
with employment, health care insurance, and other measures to assist firms and
their displaced workers.
In this spirit and to shield poor countries from the whims of international
money and financial markets, in 1971 the late James Tobin, a Yale professor of
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economics, conceived his now famous Tobin tax, a small levy on foreign currency
transactions. Though flawed in practice, the tax’s goal was to bring the benefits of
free trade to the world’s poor and assist adjustments made necessary by free trade.
Unfortunately for Professor Tobin’s proposal, anti-globalization groups later
attempted to use Tobin’s tax against his own free trade position.
Some idea of the difficulties with Tobin’s tax, for instance, is that it would not
have prevented the various financial crises in poor countries. Far more helpful
would have been measures to limit the accumulation of short-term foreign currency
liabilities in the context of pegged currency regimes. To be sure reducing the
frequency of big financial crises and increasing prospects for the poor are worthy
goals. But these problems should be handled by separate and targeted policies.
It may be that government interventions in the money and capital markets are
all efforts to correct the excesses of a decade-long experiment in which money was
free to flow worldwide. Throughout much of the post-World War II era many
countries maintained controls on capital and money markets. Thus far the growth
of controls has not spread to that of imports and exports of goods and services-
important ingredients in the process of globalization. In any case, the IMF had
hoped to make their case for a new global financial system that involves ever
greater openness in capital and money markets, and a more prominent role for
itself may well have been overtaken by events.
One result of the reimposition of controls is that it has prompted a global
redefinition of risk and a reassessment of how that risk should be valued. Until the
reassessment is completed, world money and capital markets will almost surely
remain highly volatile. Most analysts now agree that the world is a riskier place
where the IMF could not and the G-7 industrial countries would not play the role
of lender of last resort on a global scale.
It is important to put the recent attractiveness of controls on money and capital
in perspective. Economists have long argued the benefits of free trade in goods and
services. The idea that governments permit free international flow of money and
capital is of relatively recent vintage. Indeed the principal intellectual founders of
the IMF, J.M. Keynes and Harry Dexter White, feared capital and money flows
would become an independent and disruptive force that would interfere with trade.
In fact, Keynes argued that control of capital movements-both inward and outward-
should be a permanent feature of the system. For years controls were as Keynes
had hoped, more or less permanent.
The globalization of money and capital markets has indeed made their
management very difficult both domestically as well as internationally. In fact, the
various and on-going changes in global markets complicate the tasks of monetary
authorities, central banks, and international institutions in judging and lending with
systemic risk and financial crisis as events of the 1990s underscore.
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One of the more vexing problems raised in attempts to regulate money and
capital markets is their computerization and whether this will fragmentize or
centralize them. Undoubtedly, large and important traders will play for even larger
stakes, making it very difficult for the small trader to participate. The big players
will not stop at attempts to predict markets. They will want to control them. If you
are a big enough player in a market for your own move to influence the market,
then you can predict your own next move. Given past experience, the success rate
in cornering markets is not notable. More likely, computer programming will lead
to diversities in trading strategies in good part because no single program will
remain dominant.
Role of Technology
Globalization serves technology as does technology globalization. By reducing
costs of doing business internationally (as well as domestically) technological
advances have served globalization very well indeed.3 Not only does technology
work to open new markets around the world it increases the efficiency of existing
markets for products and services.
For instance, the arrival of “containerization” in sea-based (and land-based)
shipping has reduced both handling requirements and transit time for deliveries.
As for air transportation, readily available data indicate that worldwide the cost of
air freight, insured as average revenue per ton-kilometer, dropped by 78% between
1955 and 1996. Indeed, the falling cost of air freight drives significant increases in
air shipments which in 1998 accounted for about 28% of the value of U.S.
international trade. In 1965 air freight accounted for only 7% of such trade.
Other readily available examples are improved communication and
information systems that have served globalization. A case in point is that in 1930
a three-minute telephone call between New York and London would have cost
several hundred dollars. By the late 1990s such a call could be made for less than
a dollar. These advances increase the ability of business firms to provide customer
support by telephone or email at relatively low cost. By enabling firms to transmit
digital products electronically via the Internet, the importance of market proximity
is reduced for some industries.
The role of technology in money and capital markets is noted above. Its
importance is facilitating the creation of a wide range of new financial instruments.4
3 See George Macesich, Political Economy of Money: Emerging Fiat Monetary Regime
(Westport, CT, London: Praeger, 1999) pp. 77-88.
4 Ibid.
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This contributes to significant flows of financial capital discussed earlier. Computing
technology in particular enables traders to implement complex analytical models.
This in turn allows traders and other market participants to better manage risk
(e.g., through the use of such financial instruments as swaps, options, and futures).
Advances in technology increase the ability of business firms to divide up
their production processes either domestically and/or globally. Thus research and
development, design, assembly, and packaging among others, are now performed
by firms in the U.S. and elsewhere according to the ability of their outsources to
complete their assigned tasks. Again, the computer industry is but a case in point.
Where in the late 1 990s, more than 40% of domestic U.S. producer’ total shipments
were exported and more than 50% of first and intermediate domestic consumption
was imported. In fact, more than 60% by value of the hardware in a typical U.S.
personal computer system comes from Asia.
Prospects
The policies of various governments are critical to continued globalization.
In the interwar years (between World War I and World War II) much damage was
done to the processes of globalization by various trade protectionist policies. In the
case of the United States, which was a major creditor nation, it should logically
have increased its imports in order to enable other countries to earn dollars so as to
service their debt to the United States. One important way, of course, is to lower
American import tariffs. The United States did just the opposite: it increased tariffs
in 1922 (Fordney-McCumber Tariff) and again in 1930 (SmootHawley Tariff),
thereby boosting protectionism to its highest level in American history.
The entire inter-war foreign trade and debt issue was further complicated by
American insistence upon repayment of World War I debts. High tariffs however,
meant that the United States did not welcome payment of war debts in goods.
Moreover, there was not gold outside the United States for payment of debts. And,
as noted, Allied insistence that Germany pay reparation rested in part in their desire
to use the proceeds to pay war debts to the United States.
Improved arrangements known as the Dawes Plan (1924) facilitated debt
financing. The United States made concessions to its allies by lowering the rate of
interest at which the war debts accumulated. Between 1924 and 1929 all seemed to
go quite well. Germany was able to make reparation payments and the allies to
make war debt payments according to schedule.
However, the entire debt arrangement was wobbly and indeed illusory. The
fact is that American private investors were making large dollar loans to Germany.
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The Germans, in turn, used the dollars to pay reparations, and the allies used the
dollars to pay war debts. In short, it appeared as though the United States was
paying itself Given the magnitudes involved, this was not correct, but it was used
by those in favor of cancellation of debts to support their case.
This international financial circus was brought to an end by the Great
Depression of 1929 when American loans to Germany ceased. German industry
however had been reconstructed and strengthened, but democratic government in
Germany had been undermined partly over the reparations issue. International
relations among wartime allies as well as between Germany and its allies had become
embittered. In effect, attempts to collect war debts and to make reparation payments
proved to be one colossal failure. It was an experiment that was not to be repeated
in the post-World War II period.
John Maynard Keynes’s ideas in the 1930s expressed in his General Theory
provided the basis of postwar economic policy for the United States and other
Western industrial nations.5 Basic to Keynesian doctrine is the use of government
fiscal power to stimulate the economy when unemployment is high and restrain
the economy when high employment and excessive demand begin to cause wage
and price rises to reach an inflationary rate.
In general, much of postwar economic policy has been post-Keynesian in the
sense that some, but not all, theorists and policymakers in major Western industrial
countries have agreed in principle in Keynesian ideas of how to deal with
unemployment and inflation. Since their triumph in the post-war period, Keynesian
ideas have not always come up to expectation. The theories and policies have been
rigorously and increasingly challenged by many economists, most notably by Milton
Friedman.6
Since World War II government policies have been put in place that remove
barriers and distortions to world trade. For instance, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and World Trade Organization are but cases in point. Many
countries have also removed or reduced money controls on international capital
movements as noted previously.
It is now also clear to most observers that moving away from globalization
and disengaging from the global economy is not the road to economic prosperity
and rising living standards. Even critics of globalization acknowledge that countries
5 John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964).
6 Milton Friedman “The Keynes Centenary: A Monetarist Reflects.” The Economist (June 4,
1983): pp 17-18; Milton Friedman, “The Quantity Theory of Money—A Restatement.” in Studies in
the Quantity Theory of Money edited by Milton Friedman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1956).
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resorting to self-sufficiency and an independent road to prosperity have little to
show for their efforts. Most have now abandoned such efforts in favor of great
global integration.
To be sure, the institutional structures associated with globalization continue
to be developed.7 For this reason, among others, positive efforts from various
quarters to influence the development of such structures merit attention. On the
other hand, a strategy of anti-globalization threatens economic well-being and is
unlikely to gain much support.
It is the larger countries—particularly the United States—that have decisive
voice in determining the shape and form that globalization takes. In these matters
the United States in the post-World War II years has consistently promoted the role
of markets, private property rights, trade liberalization and investment, fiscal
discipline, reduction of subsidies, and the privatization of public enterprises. Thus
far these policies have worked in liberalizing world trade as indicated by the dramatic
increase in the international flow of goods and services.
7 See George Macesich, Money and Monetary Regimes: Struggle for Monetary Supremacy
(Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 2002).
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